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Screening for Bid-rigging – Does it Work? 
1 Introduction 
Bid-rigging involves groups of firms conspiring to raise prices or lower the quality of goods 
or services offered in public tenders. Although illegal, this anti-competitive practice costs 
governments and taxpayers vast sums of money every year.1 It is therefore not surprising that 
the fight against bid-rigging is currently a top priority in many countries and also a much-
debated issue internationally.2 In Switzerland it was acknowledged a few years ago that the 
fight against bid-rigging in the procurement sector should be a priority, not least because 
several bid-rigging cartels were uncovered by the Swiss Competition Commission (ComCo) 
in the recent past.3  
To detect bid-rigging (and other competition law infringements) national competition 
authorities heavily rely on leniency programs (OECD 2014) today. Switzerland is no 
exception: whistle-blowers or leniency applicants are the common denominator of recently 
prosecuted cases and contributed significantly to the uncovering of bid-rigging cartels. To 
mitigate the dependency on these external sources and actively reinforce the fight against bid-
rigging, ComCo decided to initiate a long-term project in 2008. One of the goals of this 
project was to develop a statistical screening tool with the following properties: 
1. Modest data requirements: Screening exercises will often have to rely on limited 
available public data, e.g. data collected by a procurement agency or a statistical 
                                                 
1 On average, procurement amounts to 29% of the government expenditure in OECD countries and to 13% of 
GDP. For Switzerland, procurement accounts for 23% of the government expenditure and represents 8% of the 
Swiss GDP. See OCED rapport Government at a Glance, published in 2013: 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/Government%20at%20a%20Glance%202013_Procurement%20Data%20GOV_
PGC_ETH_2013_2.pdf. 
 
2 In 2009, the OECD adopted the Guidelines for Fighting Bid-rigging in Public Procurement. These guidelines 
were followed by the adoption of a Recommendation on Fighting Bid-rigging in Public Procurement in 2012, 
which calls for governments to assess their public procurement laws and practices at all levels of government in 
order to promote more effective procurement and reduce the risk of bid-rigging in public tenders. The two 
documents mentioned and many other documents related to bid-rigging are available at the OECD homepage 
(http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/fightingbidrigginginpublicprocurement.htm). 
 
3 See Strassenbeläge Tessin (LPC 2008/1, pp. 85-112), Elektroinstallationsbetriebe Bern (LPC 2009/2, pp. 196-
222), Wettbewerbsabreden im Strassen- und Tiefbau im Kanton Aargau (LPC 2012/2, pp. 270-425), 
Wettbewerbsabreden im Strassen- und Tiefbau im Kanton Zürich (LPC 2013/4, pp. 524-652) and 
Tunnelreinigung (LPC 2015/2, pp. 193-245). Furthermore, ComCo regularly institutes proceedings concerning 
bid-rigging cases (In the beginning of 2015 three proceedings were still being investigated by ComCo). 
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office. Gathering detailed information from private firms will hardly ever be an option 
since this would immediately raise the suspicion of potential cartel members and lead 
to the destruction of any proof of collusion.  
2. Simplicity: The screening method should be simple to apply. 
3. Reliable results: Of course, no screening method will ever produce hard evidence for 
the existence of a cartel. It should, however, be able to produce evidence sufficiently 
reliable to convince a competition authority to open an investigation. 
The following procedure was chosen to build a detection method meeting these requirements: 
Starting from the existing screening literature, two screens – also called markers – were 
applied to a procurement data set in which no prior information about (potential) collusion 
was available. Both of these screens assume that collusive behavior, e.g. in the form of 
explicit coordination or an exchange of information, modifies the distribution of the bids. 
Both screens, however, did not produce unambiguous evidence as to whether collusion is 
likely to exist or not. A possible reason for this result is that the statistical methods suggested 
in the literature are not particularly well suited to detect partial collusion, i.e. collusion that 
does not involve all firms and/or all contracts in a dataset. Therefore, we designed an 
approach that allows testing for partial collusion. In general, our approach amounts to a 
collection of mutually reinforcing tests to identify potential collusion between subsets of 
firms. With the help of these tests it was possible to isolate a group of “suspicious” firms in 
our sample that exhibits the characteristics of a local bid-rigging cartel operating with cover 
bids and a – more or less pronounced – bid rotation scheme. Based on these results ComCo 
decided to open an investigation.  
In this article we present our detection method in detail. It is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents the literature on screening methods. Section 3 then explains the setup of our data set 
and provides some descriptive statistics. In section 4 two simple screens are applied to our 
data set. Given the ambiguous results in section 4, section 5 combines these two screens and 
shows how this may help to detect partial collusion. Furthermore, several tests serving to 
reinforce suspicions of partial collusion are discussed in section 5. Another test, the bid 
rotation test, is then discussed separately in section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
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2 Screening methods 
There is a growing literature on cartel detection which can roughly be divided into two 
strands: Some literature discusses structural methods for the empirical identification of 
markets prone to collusion. Such structural methods try to analyze the market structure in 
different industries, aiming at the identification of factors which are known to enhance 
respectively sustain collusion.4 In general, this approach uses relatively aggregated data on an 
industry level and can therefore often only crudely indicate whether collusion is more or less 
likely to occur in certain industries. In contrast, the so-called behavioral methods analyze the 
concrete behavior of firms in specific markets. To this purpose a multitude of more or less 
complex statistical tests may be employed.  
Harrington (2008) summarizes the literature on behavioral methods and discusses a number of 
statistical markers that may help to distinguish competitive from collusive behavior. Some of 
these markers rely on theoretical considerations from literature on collusion, while others are 
based on empirical observations from uncovered cartels (see also OECD 2014). In general, 
price- and quantity-related markers may be distinguished. Conceptually, in the case of 
tenders, the price-related markers use the information contained in the structure of the 
winning and losing bids to identify suspect bidding behavior. In contrast, the quantity-related 
markers attempt to identify collusive behavior from developments in the market shares that 
are prima vista not compatible with competitive markets. 
The most comprehensively tested price-related marker is the so called variance screen: 
Several empirical papers provide evidence for the fact that in the case of collusion prices are 
often less responsive to effective costs than in a competitive environment, i.e., price 
variability is lower in a collusive environment. Feinstein and Brock (1985) apply the variance 
screen to highway construction cartels in North Carolina and find that the coefficient of 
variation is lower when bidders collude. They also find that collusion is characterized by 
frequent and repeated interaction of the same group of bidders. More recently, Abrantes-Metz 
et al. (2006) examine a US bid-rigging cartel for frozen fish. They show that prices for frozen 
perch fell – on average – by 16% after the collapse of the cartel and the standard deviation of 
bids increased by more than 250%. Esposito and Ferrero (2006) show that the use of the 
variance screen would have been successful in detecting two cartels – one in the fuel market 
                                                 
4 See Grout and Sonderegger (2005) for an empirical discussion of the structural approach. 
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and another one in the market for baby food products sold in pharmacies – investigated by the 
Italian Competition Authority (AGCM). 
Bolotova et al. (2008) provide mixed evidence for the lysine and the citric acid cartels: In the 
lysine cartel, the standard deviation of bids was indeed significantly lower during the cartel 
period. However, these results could not be confirmed for the citric acid cartel. Abrantes-Metz 
et al. (2012) use – inter alia – a variance screen to show that daily bank quotes for the Dollar 
Libor behaved abnormally compared to other short-term borrowing rates. Another application 
of the variance screen is provided by Jiménez und Perdiguero (2012): They use the screen to 
examine price variability in the fuel market in the Spanish Canary Islands. Although they do 
not find (clear) evidence for collusion, they confirm that lower competition in markets tends 
to lower price variability.  
The variance screen has also been applied by competition authorities. Ragazzo (2012), for 
example, describes a method developed by the Brazilian Competition Policy System (BCPS) 
to screen regional gasoline markets for collusive behavior. Also, the Mexican competition 
agency used price screens to identify bid-rigging for different types of drugs: Mena-Labarthe 
(2012) as well as Estrada and Vazquez (2013) report the typical pattern of low price variance 
during collusive periods and a significant increase of price variance after the cartel collapsed.  
So far, economic theory has not provided a wholly convincing explanation for the link 
between collusion and price variability. There are two theoretical contributions in the 
literature attempting to explain why price variability may be lower in a collusive environment. 
Athey et al. (2004) consider an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which each firm’s cost is 
private information and varies over time. In each period messages concerning the firm’s costs 
are exchanged and then prices are chosen. The basic problem colluding firms face is to induce 
truthful revelation of costs. Assuming an inelastic demand, Athey et al. (2004) show that – if 
firms are sufficiently patient – optimal collusion is characterized by price rigidity. Harrington 
and Chen (2006) choose a different approach: They start out from the idea that cartels try to 
avoid detection by buyers, who become suspicious whenever they perceive anomalous 
changes in the history of prices. Assuming that a cartel is aware of how its price choice affects 
the beliefs of buyers, Harrington and Chen show that prices are less responsive to cost shocks 
than in a non-collusive environment, i.e., there is a certain degree of price rigidity. 
While price- and quantity-related markers, such as the discussed variance screen, are 
relatively simple to apply and may be implemented with a limited amount of information, 
there is also some literature dealing with more complex, econometric detection methods for 
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bid-rigging cartels. However, such methods often require firm-specific data, e.g. cost 
estimates for concrete contracts, information about cost structure and capacity utilization of 
respective firms, or the distance between the location of a firm and the project site. 
Additionally, these methods usually require the modeling of a (competitive) auction process 
serving as counterfactual for a situation without collusion. The contributions by Porter and 
Zona (1993, 1999), Pesendorfer (1999) or Bajari and Ye (2003) can be cited as examples of 
such detection methods. Typically, these authors use data from bid-rigging cartels uncovered 
earlier and condemned by a competition authority. They then model counterfactuals fitting the 
specific circumstances of the examined cartels. Such methods may be very useful for a 
competition authority in order to show the anti-competitive effects of a specific bid-rigging 
cartel within a particular investigation. Furthermore, one may learn important lessons 
concerning the behavior of collusive firms. Yet, it is questionable whether complex, 
econometric methods are indeed suited for a wider, preventive screening activity. The 
sparsely documented attempts to use such methods for ex ante screening are – so far – not 
very encouraging (see Aryal and Gabrielli 2013). 
3 Sample Construction and Descriptive Statistics 
The starting point for the construction of our sample were the annual submission statistics of a 
Swiss canton5, listing all awarded contracts, grouped by the categories services, deliveries and 
construction. These statistics contain the name of the winner of each tender, details on the 
price granted, and a very short description of the tendered project. There is, however, no 
information on the losing bids. It was decided to focus on the category construction for two 
reasons: Firstly, in this sector several bid-rigging cartels have been uncovered and 
investigated by ComCo in the recent past. It thus seems to be a sector prone to collusion. 
Secondly, due to the relatively high number of annual tenders in this sector, the setup of a 
meaningful sample seemed realistic. All contracts not relating to “classical” construction 
work were eliminated from the sample. These were e.g. contracts for road surveillance 
equipment or protection equipment against rock fall. Furthermore, tenders for tunnel 
construction were eliminated since such contracts are only executed by a handful of 
specialized firms. After this process of elimination roughly 400 contracts connected to road 
construction in the canton X remained. 
                                                 
5 Due to confidentiality requirements, we refer to that Swiss canton as canton X in the following. With respect to 
population size and surface area, canton X can be characterized as an average Swiss canton. 
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Information concerning the losing bids was gathered from the records of the tender opening, 
which contain the name of the bidders and their final bids. For 282 of the 400 contracts in the 
road construction sector, canton X was able to provide records of the tender opening. They 
cover the time period between 2004 and 2010. Table 1 summarizes some key data of the 
tenders in our sample. All in all, 138 firms submitted roughly 1’500 bids for the 282 tenders. 
Consortiums submitted 228 bids and won the tender in 78 cases. Consequently, 204 tenders 
were won by an individual firm.6 Overall, the total value of the 282 tenders – measured by the 
sum of all winning bids – amounts to roughly CHF 216 million. 
 
Table 1: Overview of the Sample (2004-2010) 
Number of tenders  282 
Number of bids submitted 1’491 
Number of firms involved 138 
Number of bids from consortiums7 228 
Number of winning bids from individual firms 204 
Number of winning bids from consortiums 78 
Total value of all 282 projects (in CHF million) 216 
 
Furthermore, Table 2 shows the distribution of the tenders over the time period considered 
and the corresponding annual total value of the contracts. The annual number and the total 
value of the conducted tenders are quite evenly distributed over the years.8 Note, however, 
that the year 2005 is an exception since an especially large contract of CHF 25 million was 
tendered. The value of the majority of the contracts in the sample is between CHF 100’000 
and CHF 600’000. The median value of the contracts amounts to roughly CHF 400’000 and 
the average contract value is around CHF 770’000. The considerable difference between the 
average and the median indicates a skewed distribution. This asymmetry is due to a few very 
large contracts in the sample. The average number of bids per tender amounts to 7 while the 
median (6) is only marginally lower. 
                                                 
6 This does not exclude the possibility that in some of these cases other firms were involved as sub-contractors. 
 
7 A consortium is a business combination in which two or more firms submit a common bid for a specific tender. 
 
8 Although the sample includes only ca. 60% of the initially identified 400 tenders, these 282 tenders reflect – on 
a value basis – roughly 95% of all the tenders in the road construction sector tendered by canton X. Thus, the 
sample does not include all contracts but prima vista all the important ones. 
 
 
7 
The tenders differ furthermore with regard to the tender procedure (invitation vs. open 
procedure). In an invitation procedure, the procurement agency invites firms directly to 
submit a bid, i.e., there is no public tender and the number of submitters is limited. In general, 
public procurement agencies are legally obliged to solicit at least three bids. The invitation 
procedure may be used for contracts with a value of up to CHF 500’000. For contracts with a 
value of more than CHF 500’000, public procurement agencies in Switzerland must institute 
an open procedure, in which, all interested firms – without any constraints – may submit a 
bid. Thus, the contract is publicly tendered. 
 
Table 2: Number and Value of Annual Tenders 
Year Number of 
Submissions 
Total value (CHF 
million) 
2004 35 26 
2005 40 55 
2006 44 23 
2007 37 30 
2008 40 22 
2009 46 28 
2010 40 32 
 
Our sample contains 135 tenders which were tendered publicly (open procedure) and 147 
tenders which were tendered by an invitation procedure. The average and the median of the 
contract values largely coincide (ca. CHF 250’000) in the invitation procedures. In contrast, 
there is a notable difference between the average (ca. CHF 1.3 million) and the median (ca. 
CHF 816’00) for the open procedures which can be explained by the existence of a certain 
number of very large contracts in the sample. The value of the 135 contracts tendered publicly 
amounts to roughly CHF 185 million, i.e., roughly 85% of the total value of all contracts in 
the sample. There is also a significant difference between the invitation and the open 
procedures with respect to the number of submitted bids: While procurement bodies usually 
invite 4 or 5 firms to submit a bid in an invitation procedure, more than 20 firms bid for 
certain large contracts in the open procedure. 
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4 Two Simple Statistical Markers 
Our data set is not well-suited to test for all the statistical markers suggested in the literature. 
The quantity-related markers9 are in particular not likely to produce meaningful results for 
two reasons: Firstly, the contracts in our sample most likely only represent a part of the firms’ 
construction activities, i.e., the firms in our sample may also be active in sectors other than 
road construction (e.g. construction of buildings). Furthermore, the sample is restricted to 
road construction contracts tendered by the procurement body of canton X and does not 
account for tenders by local procurement bodies or private stakeholders. Consequently, there 
is no reliable information concerning firm-specific market shares in our sample. Secondly, 
annual demand for road construction (i.e. the number and the size of the tendered contracts) 
may fluctuate. This notion is supported by strongly fluctuating market shares (measured by 
the annual total value of realized contracts) of the firms in our sample. It is thus rather 
unlikely that an agreement on market shares can be realized short term. Yet, a focus on long-
term market shares largely eliminates the intertemporal structure in the data imposed by 
(possible) collusion. 
We therefore decided to primarily focus on price-related markers. Again, due to different 
reasons, it was not possible to test for the whole set of the price-related markers suggested in 
the literature. For example, to test whether there is a high degree of uniformity across firms in 
dimensions such as prices for ancillary services, one needs information not available in the 
records of the tender opening. Given the information available in our data set, it seemed most 
promising to focus on markers analyzing the structure among firms’ bids. In what follows, we 
apply two such markers to our data set. 
4.1 Variance Screen 
As discussed in section 2, the variance screen is the most comprehensively tested statistical 
marker to detect collusion. It seems therefore natural to start the analysis of our data set with 
this particular marker. In the context of bid-rigging, the coefficient of variation is normally 
used to implement the variance screen since the measure is scale-invariant and thus allows for 
                                                 
9 Harrington (2008) suggests three quantity-related markers: (1) highly stable market shares over time, (2) 
subsets of firms for which each firm’s share of total supply is highly stable over time and (3) firms market shares 
negatively correlating with each other in time. 
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the comparison of bidding behavior for contracts with significantly differing values.10 In 
general, the coefficient of variation (CVj) is defined as the standard deviation (Stdj) divided by 
the arithmetic mean (µj) of all bids submitted for tender j: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗  
The empirical literature assumes that low values of the coefficient of variation indicate price 
rigidity, i.e., suspicious bidding behavior. More precisely, significant non-temporary 
decreases in the coefficient of variation are taken as indication for periods of collusion and 
vice versa. 
 
Figure 1: Variance Screen
 
 
Figure 1 shows the coefficient of variation of the bids submitted in both types of procedures 
for the – chronologically organized – 282 tenders in our sample.  As can be observed, there is 
no peculiar evolution of the coefficient of variation over time, i.e., there are prima vista no 
time periods where the coefficient of variation systematically differs from other time periods. 
There is, however, a notable difference between invitation and open procedures: On average, 
                                                 
10 See e.g. Feinstein and Brock (1985), Abrantes-Metz et al. (2012), Jiminez and Perdriguo (2012) or Ragazzo 
(2012). 
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the coefficient of variation of the open procedures amounts to 0.081 while the corresponding 
value for the invitation procedures amounts to 0.058. Statistical tests confirm that the 
difference between the two types of tender procedures is significant.11 This finding may be 
interpreted as a (weak) indication that invitation procedures are more prone to bid-rigging 
than open procedures. 
4.2 Cover Bidding Screen 
In the past few years, ComCo has uncovered several bid-rigging cartels in Switzerland.12 In 
many of these bid-rigging cases, it was striking that the difference between the loosing bids 
was systematically smaller than the difference between the winning bid and the second best 
bid. Figure 2 illustrates this finding: 
 
Figure 2: Typical Bidding Behavior in Rigged Tenders13 
 
 
Intuitively, such bidding behavior may be explained by the presence of cover bidding:  
Bidders not intending to win a contract offer distinctly higher prices than the agreed winner. 
This practice ensures that the designated winner gets the contract and that the winning bid 
                                                 
11 Note that the coefficient of variation in our sample is not distributed normally: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
for normality rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. Other normality diagnostic tests –Shapiro-
Wilk, Cramer-Von Mises and Anderson-Darling – also reject the null hypothesis (at the 1% significance level). 
The difference between the two types of tender procedures is confirmed by the Mann-Whitney test, which rejects 
the null hypothesis of no difference between the two distributions with a z-statistic of 5.58 (p-value: < 0.0001). 
Also, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null-hypothesis of no difference between the distribution of the 
coefficient of variation for both procedures with an asymptotic Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic of 3.27 (p-value: < 
0.0001). 
 
12 See footnote 3. 
 
13 The example in Figure 2 is taken from the case Strassenbeläge Tessin (LPC 2008/1, pp. 85-112). 
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appears to be competitive. There are three reasons why such bidding behavior is realistic in 
practice: Firstly, in many contracts the price is not the only criterion procurement authorities 
take into consideration. Other criteria, such as the offered technical solution, quality or 
environmental aspects, may be taken into account when deciding on the winner of a contract. 
Such non-monetary criteria may influence the award of a contract and undermine intended 
bid-rigging especially when bids are close to each other. Secondly, witnesses in bid-rigging 
cases have reported that members of bid-rigging cartels usually make sure that the designated 
winning bid is 3-5% lower than the second best bid.14 Thirdly, losing bids may be close to 
each other because no bidder wants to risk being perceived as overly expensive in the eyes of 
the procurement agency.  
Based on the described bidding behavior, it is possible to construct an alternative price-related 
marker by considering the difference between loosing bids and the difference between the two 
best bids for a specific contract.15 To test whether cover bidding might be present, we 
calculate the ratio between the difference of the two lowest bids (∆j,1) and the standard 
deviation of the loosing bids (σj,lb). This yields the following formula for the measure of 
relative distance (RD): 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 = ∆𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 
Note that the standard deviation should only be calculated for the loosing bids since the 
difference between the two best bids is anomalously high when collusion is present. Without 
this correction, the standard deviation would be distorted up.16 The relative distance measure 
has to be interpreted as follows: A RD of approximately 1 indicates that there is no difference 
in the bidding behavior of the winner and the rest of the bidders (see the reference line in 
figure 3), i.e. there is no suspicious bidding behavior. A RD (much) larger than 1 indicates, 
                                                 
14 See e.g. Strassenbeläge Tessin (LPC 2008/1, pp. 85-112, in particular recital 60) or Wettbewerbsabreden im 
Strassen- und Tiefbau im Kanton Zürich (LPC 2013/4, pp. 524-652, in particular p. 561, recital 182 and p. 573, 
recital 309 and 314). 
 
15 The general idea to consider the differences between winning and losing bids to identify bid-rigging was 
already proposed in the seventies (see OECD 1976). Yet, a concrete statistical marker has – to the best of our 
knowledge – not yet been suggested in the literature. 
 
16 It is of course possible to define the measure for relative distance differently. For instance, one may calculate 
the difference between the two best bids and divide it by the mean of the differences between losing bids instead 
of the standard deviation. We also performed the cover bidding test in this alternative way: results qualitatively 
remain, however, the same. 
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however, that cover bidding may have taken place. Figure 3 depicts the relative distance 
measure for all tenders in our sample, in chronological order and by procedures. 
 
Figure 3: Cover Bidding Screen 
 
 
From Figure 3 conclusions similar to the case of the variance screen can be drawn. On the one 
hand, there are no peculiar developments of the RD observable over time, i.e., time periods 
where the RD systematically differ from other time periods cannot be identified. On the other 
hand, with an average of 1.92 the cover bidding test again suggests that collusion is more 
likely to be present in invitation procedures. In contrast, the average of the relative distance 
measure for open procedures only amounts to 1.2.17 
 
                                                 
17 As in the case of the coefficient of variation, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (at the 5% significance level) – as 
well as the Shapiro-Wilk, Cramer-Von Mises and Anderson-Darling tests (at the 1% significance level) – rejects 
the normality hypothesis. The Mann-Whitney test confirms that there is a significant difference between the two 
types of tender procedures (z-statistic: 5.58; p-value: < 0.0001), a result also corroborated by the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (asymptotic Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic: 3.27; p-value: < 0.0001). 
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5 Screening for Partial Collusion 
Our analysis so far indicates that firms in canton X do not seem to be involved in a systematic 
market-embracing collusive scheme. Furthermore, the two applied markers suggest that 
collusion – if present at all – is more likely to occur in invitation procedures. Both of these 
results are not surprising. ComCo’s investigations concerning bid-rigging have revealed that 
cartels in construction markets often are partial, i.e., they only involve a subset of colluding 
firms or collusion is targeted at specific contracts. Thus, excluding the presence of bid-rigging 
from the results derived above would be premature. In the remainder of this section we will 
show how partial collusion may be detected.  
5.1 Multistep Procedure to Detect Partial Collusion  
A crucial prerequisite to detect partial collusion with a statistical marker is a sufficient degree 
of regular interaction between stable groups or sub-groups of firms. Irregular and selective 
bid-rigging agreements between firms loosely connected (e.g. for special types of projects) 
are, however, extremely hard – if not impossible – to identify with a screen. The approach we 
present in the following amounts to a collection of mutually reinforcing tests which allow 
conclusions as to whether collusion is likely to exist between subgroups of firms. All of the 
suggested tests may be extended, refined and adapted to the specific features of other cases in 
which bid-rigging is suspected.  
Our procedure consists of four steps. In the first step we isolate contracts and firms exhibiting 
a specific (suspicious) bidding pattern from our data set. To this purpose, we combine the 
variance and the cover bidding test, and screen for contracts which simultaneously exhibit a 
low coefficient of variation and a high relative distance measure. The reason for combining 
the two screens is simply that we want to produce a conservative sample of suspicious 
contracts and firms. Given that results pointing to the existence of bid-rigging may in practice 
trigger the opening of an antitrust investigation – most likely accompanied by drastic 
investigative measures such as surprise inspections (“dawn raids”) –, it seems to be a 
reasonable strategy to minimize the probability of type I errors right from the start.18 
                                                 
18 Statistically, a type I error occurs when the null hypothesis is incorrectly rejected. In our case, a type I error 
would imply a contract is wrongly labeled as collusive. By combining the screens, we attempt to reduce the risk 
of erroneously flagging a contract as collusive since two different criteria must be satisfied simultaneously. 
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Since a certain degree of repeated interaction is a basic ingredient of most bid-rigging cartels 
(see e.g. Feinstein and Brock 1985), we analyze in a second step whether there are groups of 
firms regularly submitting bids for the same conspicuous contracts. There is no obvious 
“automatic” process which could be used to identify possible groups of colluding firms. 
Statistical methods potentially suited for such a purpose, e.g. cluster analysis, are explorative 
processes. In other words, there is no given algorithm which could be applied to our sample – 
rather, the goal is to find an appropriate algorithm. Based on a simple iterative process we 
identify conspicuous groups of firms and analyze the interaction between firms within such 
groups.  
In a third step, we analyze geographical bidding behavior. More precisely, we want to know 
whether the identified conspicuous groups of firms are active in the entire territory of canton 
X or whether possible collusion is restricted to certain regions. Delineating the area where a 
potential bid-rigging cartel is active then allows to analyze local competitive forces, i.e., how 
many firms regularly submit bids in a certain region, whether these are mainly “suspect” firms 
or if there are other firms active in this region etc. Overall, such an analysis provides 
important conclusions as to whether (suspected) collusion is likely to be stable. Furthermore, 
an affirmative result reinforces and substantiates the group formation process. 
In the absence of side payments, bid-rigging agreements usually involve a rotation element to 
sustain collusion (see e.g. Pesendorfer 2000). In other words, a rational firm will only 
renounce to submit a truly competitive bid for a contract if other cartel members reward it for 
this behavior in the future. Typically, the reward for such cover bidding or bid suppression is 
the assignment of future contracts. In a fourth step – presented separately in section 6 – we 
develop a graphical method designed to visualize bid rotation within a group of firms. 
 
5.2 Empirical Implementation of the Multistep Procedure  
5.2.1 Identification of Conspicuous Contracts and Firms 
In the first step of the multistep procedure, we want to isolate conspicuous contracts and firms 
from our sample by simultaneously applying the variance and the cover bidding test. Two 
issues need to be discussed in this context: First, although the variance and the cover bidding 
test capture conceptually different aspects of the price setting behavior of colluding firms, it 
cannot be excluded that the results of the two tests correlate in practice. In this case, 
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combining the two screens would be of limited value. The correlation between the CV and the 
RD amounts to -0.15 (p-value: 0.0811) for open procedures and -0.16 (p-value: 0.0623) for 
invitation procedures.19 In other words, for both types of procedures, there is no significant 
correlation between the two markers. 
The second issue to discuss is the following: To separate conspicuous from inconspicuous 
tenders, a threshold for the CV and the RD has to be defined. In the case of the RD this is 
relatively straightforward: A RD larger than 1 points to a conspicuous tender (see section 4.2). 
For the CV the determination of a reasonable threshold is, however, less obvious – there is no 
theoretical argument for a specific level of the CV separating conspicuous from inconspicuous 
contracts. Yet, practical experience with bid-rigging cartels in the road construction sector 
may be a viable way to determine a threshold for the CV. Calculations made by ComCo have, 
for example, revealed that in the case of the road construction cartel in the canton of Ticino 
the CV amounted to 0.03 on average during the cartel phase. Additionally, there were almost 
no tenders with CV values higher than 0.05. After the breakdown of the cartel, the CV – on 
average – increased to 0.098.20 Given that this cartel was very well organized (the members of 
the cartel e.g. held weekly cartel meetings) and basically involved all firms located in the 
canton of Ticino, a value of 0.03 of the CV may be interpreted as a conservative benchmark 
for rigged tenders. In contrast, the road construction cartel in the canton of Aargau may serve 
as an example of a much more loosely organized cartel.21 The cartel was characterized by 
partial collusion between 17 construction firms and collusion was not targeted at all road 
construction contracts in the canton. The average CV for the roughly 100 rigged contracts that 
were investigated by ComCo amounted to 0.06. Thus, for an initial screen, one may arrive at 
the hypothesis that tenders with a CV above 0.06 and a RD below 1 are inconspicuous and 
vice versa.  
Applying this initial screen to our data set (scenario 1 in Table 3) results in the identification 
of 80 conspicuous contracts, i.e., in this scenario, bid-rigging cannot be excluded for more 
than 25% of all contracts in our sample. Given our results in section 4, it is also not surprising 
                                                 
19 We use the Spearman correlation test because the CV and the RD are not normally distributed (see section 4). 
In section 4, we highlighted a significant difference between the two types of tender procedures: the coefficient 
of variation is lower and the relative distance measure larger for the invitation procedure as compared to the 
open procedure. Given these differences it seems appropriate to apply the correlation test separately to each 
procedure type. 
 
20 See Strassenbeläge Tessin (LPC 2008/1, pp. 85-112), especially p. 103. 
 
21 See Wettbewerbsabreden im Strassen- und Tiefbau im Kanton Zürich (LPC 2013/4, pp. 524-652). 
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to find that the majority of these contracts (approx. 80%) were tendered by invitation 
procedure. Still, a non-negligible fraction of the contracts identified in scenario 1 is tendered 
by open procedure. Scenario 1 is a relatively rigorous screen. We therefore tested two more 
conservative scenarios (scenario 2 and 3 in Table 3). Even in the most conservative scenario 
(CV ≤ 0.03 and RD > 1.30) we identify 38 contracts deemed conspicuous.   
 
Table 3: Identification of Conspicuous Contracts – 3 Scenarios 
Scenario CV RD Number of Contracts 
% of Total 
Sample 
Invitation 
Procedure 
Open 
Procedure 
1 ≤ 0.06 > 1.00 80 28.4% 63 17 
2 ≤ 0.05 > 1.15 65 23.1% 53 12 
3 ≤ 0.03 > 1.30 38 13.5% 30 8 
 
Having isolated different sets of conspicuous contracts, we proceed by identifying all firms 
bidding for the corresponding contracts. More precisely, we identify the firms which have 
submitted a bid for at least 10% of all conspicuous contracts for each scenario in Table 3 (e.g., 
for scenario 1, we consider only firms which submitted a bid for at least eight conspicuous 
contracts). The purpose of this threshold is to eliminate “fringe bidders”, i.e. firms which do 
not regularly submit bids for conspicuous contracts. Such firms are unlikely to be part of a 
stable collusive scheme.  
Interestingly, the list of firms turns out to be independent of the chosen thresholds: in all three 
scenarios the same 17 firms submitted a bid for at least 10% of the conspicuous contracts. The 
only difference between the scenarios is the ranking of the firms as pertaining to the absolute 
number of bids submitted for conspicuous contracts. Thus, the observed suspect bidding 
behavior can be exclusively attributed to 17 firms. Accounting for the fact that overall 138 
firms have at least once submitted a bid in our sample, this result suggests that if bid-rigging 
occurred in canton X, these 17 firms were most likely involved.22  
                                                 
22 Of course, this does not permit the reverse conclusion that all other firms in our sample were not involved in 
collusion. One can only draw the conclusion that these firms do not exhibit a bidding behavior the applied screen 
identifies as conspicuous. 
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5.2.2 Analysis of Firm Interaction  
To analyze the interaction between the 17 suspect firms, we started with a simple matrix 
quantifying how many times a firm had participated in a conspicuous tender at the same time 
as another firm. In order to arrive at the most comprehensive result possible, we decided to 
continue the analysis with the 80 conspicuous contracts identified in scenario 1. Our results 
show that some firms often and regularly submitted bids for the same conspicuous contracts 
while others either never interacted with other suspect firms or only on a very limited basis. 
Since it is natural to assume that a bid-rigging cartel involves a certain degree of (regular) 
interaction between firms this finding is indicative of the non-existence of a collusive 
agreement between all 17 firms. Based on this argument, the matrix was reduced to sub-
matrices of firms that interacted (more or less) regularly with each other. By iterating the 
process, two potentially interesting groups of firms were condensed. For illustrative purposes 
we will only focus on one of these groups in what follows.23  
As can be observed from Table 4, firms 2, 4, 5 and 6 seem to interact often and regularly. 
Consider firm 2, for example: Overall, firm 2 submitted 17 bids for conspicuous projects. For 
16 of these projects (94%) firm 4 also submitted a bid. Furthermore, for 9 (53%), respectively 
15 (88%) of these 17 projects firms 5 and 6 likewise submitted a bid. A similar pattern can be 
found when analyzing the bidding behavior of firms 4, 5 and 6. Additionally, all these firms 
submitted a comparable number of bids for conspicuous projects. Thus, the high degree and 
symmetry of interaction between these firms may serve as an indication for a group of 
colluding firms. 
Table 4: Interaction between Firms in Conspicuous Contracts 
Firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 15 2   8  5   1   4   
2 --  17 14   16   9   15   
3 -- --   45 18   11  17   
4 -- --   --   23 12   19   
5 -- --  -- --   14 12  
6 --  --   --    --  --  20 
                                                 
23 All analyses discussed in the following were also conducted for the group of firms identified in the second 
sub-matrix. Overall, results for this second group of firms are somewhat less indicative. In particular, the degree 
of interaction between these firms is lower and bidding behavior for conspicuous contracts is less symmetric. In 
other words, in case there is collusion between the firms in this second group it is not as pronounced as the 
suspected collusion in the first group. 
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Consider next that firm 3 is a much larger construction company than the other four firms (2, 
4, 5 and 6). This is reflected in the fact that this firm submitted altogether 45 bids for 
conspicuous contracts. Besides this fact, the bidding behavior of firm 3 is however more or 
less comparable to the other four firms which suggests that firm 3 may also be a member of 
the identified group of possibly colluding firms. Lastly, the somewhat special case of firm 1 
needs to be discussed. Firm 1 is a relatively large construction company, too, which, – 
following a merger – exited the market in 2006. This explains the lower interaction between 
firm 1 and the rest of the firms in Table 4. Still, until 2006, firm 1 seems to have interacted 
regularly with the other firms. It is therefore not unlikely that firm 1 has also been a member 
of a collusive group of firms until 2006. 
5.2.3 Geographical Analysis 
The analysis of the bidding interaction conducted above allowed the identification of a group 
of six firms which were possibly involved in a collusive scheme. By means of the records of 
the bid opening of canton X, it is further possible to allocate each contract to a specific region. 
Table 5 shows the number of submitted bids for conspicuous contracts for the six suspect 
firms, sorted by the eight regions of canton X. The numbers in the brackets refer to the 
number of contracts actually won by the respective firm. 
 
Table 5: Regional Bidding for Conspicuous Contracts  
Firm 
Region: 
A B C D E F   G H 
1 5 (1) 1 (0) 2 (1) 1 (0) -- -- 4 (0) 3 (2) 
2 13 (3) -- -- -- 4 (0) -- -- -- 
3 17 (3) 8 (3) 4 (0) -- 6 (2) 2 (0) 10 (4) 3 (1) 
4 18 (5) -- -- -- 5 (0) -- -- -- 
5 13 (5) 1 (0) -- -- 2 (0) -- -- -- 
6 16 (5) -- -- -- 4 (0) -- -- -- 
 
As can easily be observed from Table 5, it is in particular region A and E where the suspect 
firms are jointly active. These are in fact neighboring regions. Participation in conspicuous 
contracts in region E is, however, substantially lower than in region A and – with the 
exception of firm 3 – no firm ever won a conspicuous contract in this region. In fact, firms 2, 
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4, 5 and 6 only won conspicuous contracts in region A, which suggests that the analysis 
should focus on this region. Overall, 21 conspicuous contracts were identified in region A 
whereby firms 2, 4, 5 and 6 won 19 of these tenders, either alone or as members of a 
consortium.24 Only two conspicuous contracts were not won by a member of the suspect 
group of firms. It is further interesting to note that (with the exception of firm 1 which exited 
the market in 2006) all firms submitted bids for at least 13 conspicuous contracts and won 
between three and five contracts. 
As mentioned above, firm 3 is much larger than the other firms, which is also confirmed by its 
wider geographic activity. Although firm 3 submitted the highest number of bids for 
conspicuous contracts in region A, it cannot be excluded that this firm is involved in other 
(regional) collusive schemes, e.g. in regions B and G. Keeping in mind that firm 1 is also a 
large construction company and exited the market in 2006, the same can be said for this firm: 
in absolute numbers, firm 1 submitted the majority of its bids for conspicuous contracts in 
region A. However, it also won conspicuous contracts in regions C and H and could therefore 
have been involved in bid-rigging activities in these regions. 
To sum up, the geographical analysis largely validates the results of the group formation 
process and raises suspicions concerning a local bid-rigging cartel operating in region A.25 In 
this context it is further interesting to note that the potential for competition from non-
members of the identified suspicious group of firms in region A is limited: According to the 
2008 firm census of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office there are only 6 construction firms 
located in region A which identified road construction as their principal business activity. 
Thus, this characteristic of region A certainly may create an environment where collusion 
could potentially be sustained and stabilized.  
                                                 
24 Note that the numbers in the brackets for the contracts won in region A sum up to 22 and not to 19. This is due 
to the fact that a consortium of two firms won a contract in three cases. 
 
25 Our observations are also supported by a Chi test: There is a statistical significant relationship between regions 
and conspicuous contracts in our sample. 
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6 Screening for Bid Rotation 
In a final step, we focus on the practice of bid rotation in order to further substantiate the 
group formation process and to produce a better understanding of the organization and 
operation of a possible bid-rigging cartel. 
6.1 The Connection between Bid Rotation and Cover Bids 
The practice of bid rotation typically involves submitting cover bids for contracts. Bid 
rotation is therefore likely to produce a distinct bidding pattern: whenever the designated 
winner submits a “low” bid, all other firms will submit a deliberately “high” bid. To test 
whether the members of our potential bid-rigging cartel systematically behave in a way 
consistent with bid rotation, we start by normalizing bids. This is necessary since the value of 
the contracts in our sample varies considerably, i.e. it is not possible to directly compare 
individual bids from different tenders. A well-known standard transformation to normalize 
bids in a tender j is the following: 
 
 
 
where  denotes the bid of firm i and  ( ) the lowest (highest) bid in tender j. 
This transformation assigns a value between 0 and 1 to every bid in our sample and therefore 
allows for a comparison of different-valued bids. Note that value 0 is always assigned to the 
lowest bid, while the highest bid gets assigned value 1. 
With the help of these normalized bids it is now possible to analyze the bidding behavior of 
the suspect firms pairwise. The basic idea of this analysis is illustrated in Figure 4: For all 
conspicuous contracts in which two suspect firms simultaneously submitted a bid, the 
corresponding normalized values are shown in the x/y-space. A point on the ordinate or the 
abscissa implies that one of the two firms actually won the contract, i.e. submitted the lowest 
bid in a distinctive tender.26 For all other points, none of the two firms considered in the 
diagram were assigned the contract.  
                                                 
26 All of the 21 conspicuous contracts analyzed in section 5 and 6 were awarded to the lowest bidder. 
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In a competitive environment – i.e., when firms calculate bids independently – one would 
expect the combinations of bids to be distributed (more or less) randomly in the x/y-space.27 
The most competitive combinations of bids are to be found in the bottom left quadrant close 
to the origin. Furthermore, combinations of bids where only one of the considered firms bids 
aggressively are to be found close to the ordinate respectively the abscissa. In general, when 
firms bid independently (i.e., in a situation without collusion) one would expect to find a 
certain mass of points in the bottom left, the top left and the bottom right quadrant of Figure 
4. 
Figure 4: Competitive vs. Non-Competitive Bids 
 
In contrast, if bids are systematically calculated to ensure that a designated firm wins a tender 
– i.e., cover bidding is present – one would expect to find the following graphical pattern: 
First, there should be a tendency to find cover bids submitted for the other considered firm 
either on the ordinate in the top left quadrant or on the abscissa in the bottom right quadrant. 
Second, if the considered firms jointly and repeatedly cover other cartel firms, this will lead to 
a certain mass of points in the top right quadrant. The shaded areas of Figure 6 show where 
cover bids are likely to be found.28 
                                                 
27 This intuition is confirmed by an analysis of the bidding behavior of non-suspicious firms and contracts in our 
sample: bids are not accumulated in particular regions of the x/y-space, i.e., they are – more or less – evenly 
distributed all over the x/y-space.  
28 Note that it is not possible to precisely determine the boundaries of the areas where cover bids are likely to be 
found. The boundaries of the shaded areas in Figure 4 should be regarded as indicative. 
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6.2 Empirical Implementation 
Figure 5 shows the pairwise bidding behavior of the six suspect firms for the conspicuous 
contracts in region A.29 Each contract is assigned a number indicating the firm which actually 
won the respective contract. Note that there is one contract not won by the group of the six 
suspect firms. This contract is marked with a zero. Furthermore, when a consortium wins the 
tender, the number of both firms is indicated. As can easily be observed, the individual 
diagrams do not point in the direction of much competitive interaction between the suspect 
firms. Rather, the depicted bidding behavior seems compatible with cover bidding: there are 
hardly any points in the area where competitive bids would be expected. The bottom left 
quadrant is in all cases empty or near empty. Furthermore, there are no loosing bids notably 
lower than 0.4, which suggests that there are substantial price differences between the 
winning and the losing bids in all respective tenders. 
This first result does not come as a complete surprise since all considered tenders showed a 
certain conspicuousness as pertaining to the cover bidding test, i.e., these contracts are inter 
alia characterized by the fact that the difference between loosing bids is systematically 
smaller than between the winning and the second best bid. The diagrams contain, however, 
much more information. In particular, they visualize the connection between cover bids and 
bid rotation: From Figure 5 it can be observed that all suspect firms submit bids for 
conspicuous contracts with pronounced regularity.30 Each of the suspect firms has on average 
and simultaneously with another suspect firm submitted bids for roughly 10 conspicuous 
contracts. An additional analysis shows that suspect firms exclusively submitted bids for 14 
contracts, and that 91% of all considered submitted bids came from the suspect group of 
firms. These results and figures point in the direction of a high degree of entanglement 
between the suspect firms. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
29 We renounce to show three graphs in Figure 5 since they are characterized by very few interactions between 
the two bidders and are therefore not illustrative. All three suppressed graphs involve firm 1 which exited the 
market in 2006. 
 
30 It should not be assumed that all suspect firms submit a bid for every rigged tender. Factors, such as the 
specialization of firms, distance to the construction site, capacity utilization etc., decide which firms of a cartel 
will submit a bid for a distinct contract. Furthermore, the possibility of bid suppression has to be kept in mind. 
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Figure 5: Pairwise Bidding Behavior for Suspect Firms in Region A 
 
 
There is another interesting observation derived from Figure 5. Considering the winning bids 
on the ordinates and abscissas, we observe a certain symmetry: The number of winning and 
(possible) cover bids between the individual firms is largely equal.31 This may be taken as an 
indication for the fact that “scores” between the firms exist and get settled. In summary, the 
identified group-internal bidding behavior may well be compatible with a bid-rigging cartel 
operating with cover bids and a – more or less pronounced – rotation scheme. 
                                                 
 
31 Since the distinct contracts vary with respect to contract values, there is no reason to belief that the number of 
winning and (possible) cover bids between two firms must necessarily be equal. A cover bid for a large contract 
may e.g. be worth two cover bids for smaller contracts. 
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7 Conclusions 
A successful fight against bid-rigging today still largely depends on whistle-blowers or 
leniency applicants. Screening tools may therefore constitute important instruments to 
mitigate the dependency on these external sources and actively reinforce the fight against bid-
rigging. Besides the benefit of identifying concrete bid-rigging cartels, the successful 
implementation of cartel detection instruments is furthermore likely to have a strong 
deterrence effect. In this paper we presented a detection method characterized by the 
following three properties: Its data requirements is relatively modest, it is simple to apply, and 
it has produced evidence considered sufficient enough to open an antitrust investigation. In 
our view, all of these properties are crucial for preventive screening activities of any 
competition or procurement authority.  
The presented approach to detect bid-rigging contributes to the screening literature in several 
ways. First, we present a new statistical marker to detect cover bidding. Second, we call 
attention to the possibility of partial collusion in a data set, which implies that the classical 
markers discussed in the literature will fail, and propose a way to deal with this problem. In 
particular, we show how benchmarks and the combination of (uncorrelated) screens may be 
used to identify subsets of conspicuous contracts and firms. To substantiate and validate 
suspicions of collusive behavior we further discuss a collection of mutually reinforcing tests 
providing conclusions as to whether a bid-rigging cartel is likely to exist. 
Although the application of the suggested method to previously uncovered bid-rigging cases 
in Swiss road construction delivers coherent results, our method is, of course, as all other 
methods discussed in the literature, to a certain degree case-specific and data driven. Some of 
the suggested tests may be inapplicable depending on the specific features of the industry in 
which bid-rigging is suspected. Others may have to be extended, refined and adapted. Given 
that collusion may take a multitude of forms in the real world and data availability may differ 
from case to case, the flexibility of our “toolbox-approach”, however, seems to be more of an 
advantage than a disadvantage.  
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